REBUILDING TRUST

1. INTRODUCTION

New Labour strategy to rebuild trust is based on regulating behaviour, ensuring administrative competence, and establishing wider opportunities for participation in conditions of social and economic stability. This strategy thus targets many areas of public concern.

However, such an approach overlooks the fact that low trust is as much a matter of public perception; making services reliable, and preventing ‘misuse of office’ leaves untouched a number of deep causes which feed into this intractable public perception. Offering wider opportunities for political participation does not guarantee that new devolved institutions will not be affected by the same scepticism as the old. Many new trends suggest that ‘rebuilding trust’ beyond the millennium requires both realism, in accepting that harsh new conditions exist, and idealism, in attacking those areas where genuine progress may be made.

Absence of trust is not confined to Government however. It is an issue in a number of areas:

• intra-organisational trust - within organisations
• inter-organisational trust - between organisations
• trust in organisations - between organisations and those they serve
• social trust - between individuals in particular communities

These areas should not be seen as separate and different from each other; absence of trust in one area may overflow into other areas. Improvements in trust in one area may involve undermining it in others.

However, wherever low trust exists it comprises two straightforward components: a perception of bad intentions (or lack of virtue), and a perception of incompetence (or incapacity). Effective policy must change these perceptions.

2. WHY IS TRUST ATTRACTIVE?

Trust has some very attractive features:

i) it is a resource which tends to increase through use.

ii) it can enable co-ordination without coercion or competition (it can also be an element in both coercion and competition).

iii) it enables commitments to be undertaken in situations of high risk.

iv) it is often held to underpin successful economies ( an element of ‘social capital’ and

‘entrepreneurship’ being the ability to form new alliances and relationships, and an element of

dynamism being freedom from regulation).

v) it may also make governing easier - a trusted government is less likely to face challenge and questioning.

vi) trust exists at different levels of belief. Although it may be lost in specific areas of

government activity, beliefs in the value of ‘the system’ as a whole

seem relatively impervious. It is therefore a ‘deep resource’.

vii) it is a convenient electoral catch-all.

It is therefore not surprising that the ‘rebuilding’ of such a valuable resource should have formed a central plank in the 1997 election campaign . However rebuilding trust may not be easy.

i) trust is a subjective perception of likely future behaviour, it is therefore not easy to manufacture or deliver through public policy interventions.

ii) rational choice theory suggests powerful reasons why co-operative behaviour may be inherently difficult to maintain or build.

iii) trust is fragile, and is maintained through an absence of contrary evidence. Thus even single ‘slips’ can destroy longstanding trust relationships. Trust tends to suffer from ‘ratchet’ effects. (Exception - true believers often continue to trust despite contrary evidence).

iv) low trust relationships contain self-fulfilling elements which become ‘locked in.’ In prevailing conditions of low trust , for example, ‘open government’ may sometimes provides further support to well-established patterns of belief founded on suspicion and fear.

v) although we know what may dissipate trust, we are less clear about how it can be ‘rebuilt’ - merely regulating behaviours which appear to have led to low trust may be ‘bolting the stable door after the horse has gone’.

vi) rebuilding trust may require processes which are significantly different to building trust - typically involving admissions of guilt, apology, compensation, and punishment, each of which may have significant costs.

vii) setting unsustainable standards for behaviour may undermine efficiency and hence competence and future trust.

viii) trust may not be associated with optimal outcomes. Types of trust which may be damaging include : that within criminal gangs, zenophobia, and ‘groupthink’ Trust is therefore only beneficial when associated with sets of values which are worthwhile, and when conditional and limited rather than absolute.

ix) trusting relationships sometimes lack the clarity and consistency required for effective

administration.

x) as trust is a matter of reputation, society must be stable enough to enable the ongoing

interactions which enable reputations to be built up, and open enough to enable intentions and

competence to be judged.

xi) trust may only flourish in those limited situations where ‘at least one party is free to

disappoint the other, free enough to avoid a risky relationship and constrained enough to

consider that relationship an attractive option’ i.e. where there is discretion.

4. THE ROOTS OF LOW TRUST

4.1 Social and economic factors

social trust is often thought of as a ‘given’, a product of the natural, informal world which we all inhabit, or of historical circumstances. Putnam’s ‘civic society,’ for example, is rooted deep in the history of Italy. Early research by Aberbach and Walker shows important links between political trust, and feelings of deprivation, together with perceptions of social inclusion. Social inclusion is also stressed by Mishler and Rose as a factor underpinning low trust by the wider population in specific institutions. Such feelings of distrust are also closely linked to a) perceptions of the future strength of the economy b) individual perceptions of economic vulnerability c) the perceived competence of previous regimes.

data shows big variations between perceptions of different professions with those with strongly altruistic intentions (teachers, doctors, clergymen) far more highly trusted than businesspeople, politicians, and government ministers. While the former have retained confidence, there has been a sharp decline in respect for the latter.

downward pressure on public spending has made fail-safe public services harder to deliver. Extra staff are often simply not available to deal with sudden increases in demand. Flexibility is hard to achieve in conditions of scarce resources.

technology poses particular problems, as we develop both increasingly ‘tightly coupled’ systems which are vulnerable to catastrophic failures , and particular chemical/biological threats whose boundaries and scale are unknown and uncompensatable in the event of failures.

as society becomes more complex, the attribution of blame and responsibility for failures becomes more diffuse. As established value systems become more diverse, the easy frames of reference which might have made events such as the ‘Arms to Iraq’ affair understandable and ‘actionable’ have collapsed, leaving widespread dissatisfaction and confusion .

rapid change prevents the building of reputation through repeat transactions. More often than not we are now members of ‘quick groups’, which behave ‘as if’ the members trust each other while secretly incurring heavy costs by hedging our bets and preparing exit routes in case things go wrong.

4.2 Political factors

politicians and managers attempt to establish patterns of relationships which may be either high or low trust in nature. The ‘Thatcher effect’ may be quite profound here - elevating self-interest, undermining faith in public bureaucracies, creating social and economic uncertainty and driving market forms deep into every corner of British society Rowntree/MORI ‘state of the nation’ polls show a major shift in confidence in institutions of government between 1973 and 1995 which may be a response to these structural and ideological changes.

developments in the USA and elsewhere show how moral or lifestyle issues now cut across party lines, fracturing traditional allegiances, and challenging administrative and political hierarchies with new problems which cannot be easily processed.

political competition increasingly hinges around issues of personal conduct and probity. Tightening standards may merely provide more ammunition for such competition.

having conquered those issues which are easily conquered, government is left with the intractable or ‘wicked problems’ in which a reduction in the rate or scale of failure may be the only practicable objective. Even in simple policy areas (such as parks and open spaces), the interaction of many government departments may unintentionally create negative effects Citizens may be easily persuaded not to entrust activities to government, hence undermining competence in a downward spiral of declining trust.

Britain remains in the ‘dominant party’ model, albeit with a different party than before. Such systems are unusually vulnerable to political scandal, especially in conditions of economic recession. Intense intra-party competition is also commonplace in dominant party systems, providing a regular supply of leaks from frustrated careerists within the government’s own ranks.

4.3 Media ownership and values

changes in patterns of media ownership and intense competition have unhitched the majority of the British press from loyalty to any particular political party, and placed a premium on stories which boost sales.

presidential and personality politics is then exaggerated still further by shifting media news values, resulting in extensive ‘tabloidisation’ of reporting.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Adapting to low trust

If we accept that low trust in politics is here to stay, what are the implications?

5.1.1. Citizens will increasingly vote against, rather than for governments. The basis of political legitimacy will therefore be substantially different, and weaker than before. Public policy initiatives will need to be more carefully insulated against lack of support, or designed to engineer that support. Such processes must be integrated into all policy planning.

5.1.2 As trust in government is now such a scarce resource, it must be husbanded carefully. The recent instances of minor failures escalating into crises must be avoided by new fail-safe methods of policy design, and new ways of identifying and ‘pulling the plug’ on policies which are going wrong.

5.1.3 Politicians and managers may need to learn to use public panic as a source of energy for change, rather than as something to be feared and avoided. At the very least robust organisations are required which can respond effectively to major pressures from public opinion whilst rapidly re-adjusting policy and strategy. Such organisations may well be different in terms of structure, culture and systems to those which have gone before.

5.1.4 New ways must be found to maintain the morale of public sector workers who face blame for ‘failure’ over what are more difficult policies than ever before, in harsher conditions.

5.1.5 A continuing explosion in judicial review and appeal cases will require the design of more streamlined ‘ fast track ‘procedures.

5.1.6 Major claims for compensation will be more commonplace and more persistent. Funding and procedures need to be in place to deal with this.

5.1.7 Recent inquiries have begin to fail in their function of promoting learning, identifying blame, or drawing a line under issues and enabling a fresh start to be made. Public inquiry procedures will need radical revision to strengthen their capacity to handle very high levels of technical complexity combined with volatile politics. Expert and lay assessors must be appointed, and minority reports actively encouraged. Terms of reference should be subject to independent review. Much wider debate must follow public inquiry reports.

5.1.7 Managers will need to learn to work not merely in the present and future, but also to work in the past, justifying and defending past decisions as much as planning present or future ones. Administrative systems will need to be maintained which have memory as well as foresight, without becoming overly bureaucratic.

5.1.8 New financial and legal instruments will need to be found to generate ‘as if’ or ‘quick trust’ without incurring huge costs. Managers will need to be trained in these techniques and methods.

5.1.9 Politicians must expect a harsher media climate, and not exacerbate poor media relations by impatient or threatening behaviour. Attempts to gag the press or ‘incorporate’ media moguls will only deepen public disquiet. The media climate is here to stay.

5.1.10 The government should turn low trust to advantage. It can provide a useful check on conduct in some areas. It should listen to low trust, but not grant it power. Above all, it should not design new institutions which extend low trust relationships or enshrine them unless there are good grounds to believe they are necessary.

5.2 Intervening to rebuild trust

5.2.1 We need a clearer view of where trust is weakest, and where this is most damaging. A social audit of trust should be undertaken on a regular basis, bringing together available data and where necessary commissioning new data. Such an audit would allow government to both map changes in levels of trust, and develop better hypotheses about the origins of those changes.

5.2.2 Where institutions are so complex as to engender low trust, we need to make them simpler.

This is vital both in the regulation of conduct , as much as in the delivery of services.

5.2.3 We need to develop an inventory of good practice eg following breaches of trust (after disasters, scandals etc), as well as initiatives in any of the areas where trust is important. Real-life practices in one area could then be tried out in others eg experiments in restorative justice (victims and perpetrators meet) might be transferable to other areas.

5.2.4 Many elements of trust involve communication across and between organisations. The value of such activity is not immediately apparent in accounting (or economics), and hence organisations have lost many of the staff who kept such communication going. Organisations need to plan to employ ‘redundant’ personnel as a percentage of all wage costs. Many are finding benefits in using older staff as ‘go-betweens’ , building trust where relationships have broken down, exploring long-term possibilities, or simply maintaining the organisation as a social system.

5.2.5 At the level of societies as a whole, Universities and the voluntary sector have a key role to play in bridging the gaps between different organisations and different knowledge bases, and in speculating about future issues. The current integration of these instituions into state led systems of performance measurement (RAE/contract culture) distorts their vital ‘horizontal’ communicative activities.

5.2.6 We need to challenge the dominance of rational choice models of social action in the intellectual world as much as in the real world. The public research agenda in the social sciences and humanities must give priority to projects which establish or work from broader conceptions of human nature, and which address the issues in this paper.

5.2.7 New, stable institutions must be encouraged at all levels in society, but these will need to have large incentives towards participation in order to overcome cynicism and distrust. Devolved institutions must therefore be granted large discretion and be genuinely deliberative, but also be fail-safe.

5.2.8 The sclerosis and risk of clientelism inherent in one party rule must be challenged by much more vigorous arrangements for rotation in office. Public consultations must be genuinely discursive opportunities for ‘outsider’ groups to comment. However, such arrangements must also be transparent, fair, and not compromise the autonomy of such groups. Communication aids trust as it establishes: a) certainty of intent b) avoids depersonification and fear of exploitation Openness is not merely ‘open government’ , but making oneself available in a forum where both intention and competence can be tested and negotiated.

5.2.9 Whistle blowing procedures, and career planning within the Labour Party may reduce the need to continually ‘firefight’ over inaccurate or unnecessarily damaging disclosures of information.

5.2.10 Research suggests trusting relationships often start small, but offer large long -term rewards. Politics must both ‘stick to the knitting’ (ie deliver competent, small scale gains ) and promise the bigger picture if trust is to be built up. Labour must clearly articulate what that picture is, and how it benefits their many voters.

5.2.11 Breaches of trust must be followed by swift and clear action, which includes reliable due process for those accused.

5.2.12 Intractable issues need not be graveyards for political reputations. Indeed the opposite may be the case. The experience of Ireland shows how the tackling of such issues re-establishes public confidence in the intentions of government, or its virtue. Failure does not mean conclusions are drawn about incompetence. There are many more issues which potentially fit this bill (eg homelessness).

5.2.13 Understand how high trust in one area interacts with trust in another. Attempt to build synergy between trust in different areas. People living in safe communities form networks through which they find and create jobs, which in turn creates confidence in the future, trust in institutions, and both the capacity and motivation to participate. Identify clearly the points at which these chains of trust break down, and act upon them.

5.2.14 Develop the skills of social entrepreneurship in the wider population through citizenship training and education.

5.2.15 Economic stability and welfare garuantees provide firm foundations of trust.

5.2.16 Citizens trust governments on the basis of how they are compared with previous regimes.

The writing of the true history of the Tories and the resolute investigation of past failings may help build trust in this government.

5.2.17 Wise populism is required to respond to the new volatility and lack of traditional partisanship of the public. Such a strategy is not slavish following of the public whim, but attention to deep public value systems. However such an approach requires new quick working methods in policy advice (to ensure better scrutiny of proposals in less time) and more open relationships between political parties and public managers and the wider public they serve. This will require extensive training and development.