The Left's long march
With the intellectual and political tide running strongly in one direction, as it has been these past twenty years in favour of individualism and commercialism, attempts to define a third way tend to follow a certain pattern.
When communism was thought viable, democratic socialism was the third way. Later, many saw social democracy as the third way. Since electorates persistently rejected social democracy, a third way was sought between it and free market capitalism. This was social market capitalism or, in the UK, stakeholder capitalism. Some are now looking for the third way between it and free-market capitalism....
This is known to the mathematicians as an asymptotic process and its ultimate destination is clear enough.
One 'solution' is to accept the inevitability of free market capitalism and ask whether and how a shrunken state should use its residual powers to ameliorate the worst effects of that system. Some - notably the right-wing think tanks - do interpret the Blair government's mission as being exactly that.
Another approach is to go back to principles, ask what are the fundamentals of the left wing or ex-socialist value system and seek more actively to promote those, albeit in ways that are consistent with an international market system. This, no doubt, is what most members of the government would really like to do. It can be called the third way since it is likely to involve digging in heels against some aspects of current liberal, individualist orthodoxy.
Beyond Left and Right?
Nonetheless, it is tempting to throw in a losing hand and claim the game itself has changed. The third way is not a new strategy in the old game; it is the way ahead in a totally new game, going beyond left and right. That may be a good PR approach but it will help clear thinking to examine whether it actually makes sense.
People who speak of going beyond left and right often do not distinguish between the policy positions of the left and right in any particular historical epoch and going beyond the notions of left and right themselves. Policies, of course, depend on circumstances and should always be subject to evolution and change and, occasionally, to radical revision. The policy positions of the left and right and the things that divide them will change. But the notions of left and right themselves have been around since the French revolution; they predate socialism or collectivism of any sort - now thought to synonymous with 'left'. I propose the following definition.
People on the left are those who, looking at any human society, with its inevitable stratifications by power and wealth, think things would be better if more of the power and wealth available were redirected toward the bottom of the heap. That does not necessarily entail any simple tax-based redistribution or hand-outs; there are many ways to reform a system. But the redirection of relative opportunities to the less advantaged is the distinguishing feature of the left. Conservatives believe that any such attempt to redirect opportunity, power or wealth would make society function worse and should be avoided. Reactionaries persuade themselves that society would function better if more advantage were given to the relatively well off.
Left and right, as thereby defined, are not normative terms. If economic activity for the forseeable future is driven largely by self interest (though utopian socialists may regret it), it is perfectly possible for either the left or right view to be correct in a given situation at any given time. Capitalism is a system that works via self-interest. The powerful, but also the gifted and the fortunate, tend to win at the expense of the weak, but also the stupid, feckless or unlucky. A society that allows the results to become cumulative and lead to savage inequalities is one danger but another is a system that stifles enterprise or even self-reliance by too procrustean an attempt to redistribute the results of economic activity.
That definition of left and right does not encapsulate all of politics. Evidently there are many issues, such as the reform of institutions, political freedoms, the environment, educational methods and, perhaps, gender issues, which can divide people on other than a left-right basis. An important instance is the issue of communitarian values versus permissive or libertarian ones in matters such as drugs legislation and in the framing of social policy. It is notable, however, that the left-right distinction permeates many issues that seem, at first glance, to be independent of it. If a group is discriminated against, be it an ethnic group or a whole sex, it comes more naturally to the left to take up their cause as part of a scheme of change to help the relatively disadvantaged.
If left and right are enduring categories, why is there a current tendency to deny them or to want to move beyond them?
Two reasons are cited; one is bad, the other good. The bad one is that owing to 'globalization' our basic political unit, the nation state, is now impotent to order economc activity or to affect income distribution at all, without grave risk to general prosperity. There is no point in discussing something that cannot be helped so left-right issues are irrelevant. That view, while fashionable, is just plain wrong. There is a growing literature about its errors and limitations.
The better reason looks to the sociology of developed societies. It holds that while in principle the left-right distinction still holds, societies have developed in such a way as to make any left-wing electoral coalition impossible. The mass proletariat with a highly developed class consciousness has disappeared. Most people see advancement in purely personal terms. A successful electoral coalition must include reasonably well-to-do people who are frightened of any talk of redistribution.
It is quite possible to argue about how great a change there has been in popular attitudes and how tight a constraint electoral considerations impose on schemes for redistribution but it is difficult to deny that there has been a shift and a constraint exists. How can one characterise the New Labour response?
New Labour is not monolithic - fortunately. Any reasonably lively movement always has different strains and New Labour is no exception. That fact has been effectively disguised by the convenient device of contrasting 'New' and 'Old' Labour - as if both were homogenous and any disputes were between two clearly defined camps and so were 'external' to New Labour. This fiction had presentational advantages for an election but a fiction it is. Intellectual life presupposes and entails debate, even dispute. The positions I now describe are both 'New Labour' ones. Everyone accepts, as a premise, that the centre of political gravity has moved to the right, owing to the sociological changes described above.
The Radical Centre
One school argues as follows.
There is no advantage in emphasising any specifically left-wing elements in Labour's programme. Better to talk of the 'radical centre', an oxymoron certainly but some poetic licence is permissible. This recognises the necessity of keeping a large part of the middle class within the coalition. Electoral success precludes any direct or obvious increase in the proportion of GDP that goes on taxation and government spending. The restriction on tax and spend necessarily restricts the redistributive ambitions that it is possible to maintain. (It is incompatible with Croslandite social democracy for that reason). The most just and humane response is to confine those ambitions to helping the very worst off people in society, those who risk being altogether ' excluded'. While many resources must be devoted if such people are to be helped, they are a small proportion of the population, fewer than 10 per cent, so the task is manageable. The excluded also account for a very high proportion of the most visible social problems, such as crime. So if they can be helped, the pay-off in terms of social peace will be appreciable. While that will require resources it does not consist simply of bigger hand-outs but of helping many of the excluded to find work.
If the necessary resources are to be mobilised to help the excluded, within existing taxation parameters, other aspects of the welfare state, notably middle-class benefits cannot be permitted to grow. As people's expectations rise, they must be encouraged to make more provision for themselves. This is not popular in itself but is thought to be more popular than the alternative of higher taxes. It is likely to lead to some increase in inequality of provision and the most adversely affected will be the fairly poor, those above the target 'excluded' group but near the bottom of the scale comprising everyone else. People from this group, for example, are the ones likely to be discouraged from going to university by the charging of fees. No-one applauds this; it just seems to many to be the least evil. These are the 'hard choices' often spoken of.
The new Centre-Left
A second school regards that agenda as erring in the direction of caution. It wants a modernised centre-left rather than a radical centre. It accepts tight restrictions on mobilising resources through the state but nonetheless wants to use the room for maneouvre it believes exists. It notes that 'New Deal' for example is a classic case of 'tax and spend'. The cornerstone of Labour's programme, it would have been ruled out by strict application of the no-more-tax-and-spend principle. There is more scope for such judicious departures from orthodoxy.
The extra room they buy should be used to maintain the principle of universalism in welfare services. Universalism is desirable on several grounds. First, while apparently 'expensive' in requiring higher taxes or contributions, it may actually be efficient. The middle classes may get a good deal in that the extra taxes would still be less than the private charges that are the alternative. That would be true if universal schemes - such as insurance - enjoyed economies of scale or scope. Second, universalism is necessary to protect the position of the poor or nearly poor. The middle classes will not support a decent service if it is quite separate from the private provision they have to make on their own account. Thirdly, national welfare institutions are an important part of the psychological furniture; they contribute to a sense of shared destiny and hence shared citizenship. Fourthly, targeting or safety net services creates financial disincentives for those people on the fringes of qualifying.
Points of debate
Since those advantages of universalism are clear and uncontroversial, the debate between the two schools hinges essentially on a disagreement about what people will tolerate as taxpayers or what they really want in the way of services. Universalism versus targeting is, in practice, a question of degree rather than either-or. But it tends to be a left-right issue because it comes down to asking how much we are supposed to worry about the almost poor.
It cuts across the communitarian-libertarian divide, however, which exists within New Labour as it does within all British political groups and which is not a left-right matter, as I have defined that. A universalist-communitarian, for example, lays great emphasis on the insurance principle. People can be made to pay more in if the link between personal contribution and personal desert is emphasised. This is also regarded as morally preferable. Universalist libertarians think contribution should be linked to ability to pay rather than to entitlement and contributions thereby become progressive and tend to merge with the tax system.
Those who are pessimistic that the voters will agree to pay more whichever route is chosen fall into my first group - believing in targeting state intervention more narrowly and depending more on private provision. They can in principle be either libertarians or communitarians. In practice, however, they are likely to gravitate to the communitarian camp. The reason is as follows: targeting welfare benefits on the most needy creates massive adverse incentives for those near the borderline of qualifying as needy. These disincentives can be relieved by extending income-related benefits progressively up the income scale but that is expensive and cuts across the cardinal need for economy. How can we prevent exclusion while increasing the financial penalties on taking work and earning more? The answer is only by making all benefits conditional and bearing down harder on the feckless. A moralistic justification is helpful for such a policy.
There are, of course, other issues which distinguish the centre left from the radical centre. These do not currently include macroeconomics (the preoccupation only of 'Old Labour' at present), though that may change. They do include the extent of labour market regulation, another area where policy has a potentially direct influence on income distribution.
IPPR's position
IPPR is not a person, of course, and does not have a position as such. Yet the Institute's writings by their selection of problems to address clearly reflect a philosophy and approach. How does it relate to the large themes I have sketched so far?
The IPPR was recently described as a group of earnest young compromisers. I think it was meant as an insult but in this context it has merit. IPPR has always been concerned with tackling real problems in the here and now rather than sketching utopias. As such it accepts the characterisation of political reality described above that is common to all schools within New Labour. It does regard tax revenue as a scarce indeed precious resource, implying that expenditure commitments must be carefully considered.
Nonetheless, it is clearly of the Left. While it has always been aware of political and electoral imperatives it has not - with occasional exceptions - sought to coin new slogans. It has been more concerned to think through positions than to market them though marketing is essential. That means it has worried about the future of the Left and the current meaning of equality rather than proclaimed that these things are now passé. Two publications of recent years have been called Reinventing the Left and Equality.
It accepts that hard choices must be made and tax resistance and demographics pose problems. But it emphatically does not believe that the welfare state must end or be slimmed down to a safety net, or even a trampoline, for the most disadvantaged. In some areas, traditional taxing and spending cannot keep pace with people's expectations and targeting is required, leaving more to individual provision. Pensions is an example of that. But in other areas, universalism is of the essence in ensuring equality of opportunity and a sense of citizenship. Education and health care fall into that category as does unemployment provision. Some of the options are spelled out in Welfare in Working Order. It is true that Social Justice, the repor t of the Social Justice Commission, in its search for the practical, broached university fees and affluence tests for some benefits but clearly in the context of defining a hard core of key services to which there should be universal entitlement. Ernest compromise, if you like.
IPPR's probings have not rested at a general level. Welfare in Working Order looks at the detail of delivering New Deal and The Inclusive Society (forthcoming) also examines the nitty-gritty of countering social exclusion. Nor has the Institute ducked the tough questions of how to pay for the continuing welfare state. Growth With Stability examined the macroeconomic background and the most recent issue of New Economy proposes new revenue sources for the welfare state. It is firmly optimistic about the future of a welfare state which commands universal consent and supports the weaker members of society
On issues that are not so obviously left-right, IPPR has been a vehement proponent of constitutional reform, including devolution and House of Lords reform (The State and the Nations, The House of Lords). This interest stems from a continuing 'statist' element in IPPR thinking. While the Institute has been alive to the virtues of self help and civic association (publishing inter alia Social Capital) it has always been clear that some decisive action to protect the weaker elements of society must come from the state. If that action is to be well designed, legitimate and accepted, the political system must function well. Ossified or inappropriate institutions are bad for democracy and particularly bad for the Left. The political reform elements in the New Labour agenda recognise that.
Finally, on the delicate issue of communitarianism versus libertarianism, IPPR publications have generally tended to line up with the libertarians. Social cohesion, its publications have tended to insist, must be based on tolerance and a readiness to accept that social formations and ways of life are changing just as fast as technology and in a multi-cultural society are inherently diverse. Of course social judgments are possible, indeed obligatory. Rights do entail responsibilities. But only responsibilities that people really feel can be made operative. Social authoritarianism has little role in IPPR's vision of the Left.
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