The Caledonian bog claimed another victim with John Major's abrupt dismissal of Stephen Dorrell as the Conservatives' roving spokesman on devolution in mid-February. But New Labour is tiptoeing round the bog in the vain hope that it will not be sucked in. It is entirely predictable that Scottish devolution will cause endless grief to the next Labour government. You only have to look at 1886, 1893, 1912, 1914, 1920, 1922, and 1974_79. And John Major and Michael Forsyth are doing their quite sophisticated best to ensure that Labour is sucked in.
Devolution, as currently proposed, is so unworkable that it must degenerate one way back to unionism, or the other way on to federalism or independence. The state of Scottish opinion makes a return to unionism impossible. Federalism would mean designing institutions for England, or for the English regions one by one, that nobody wants. So we should take a deep breath, think the unthinkable, and endorse an independent Scotland.
Now as from 1974 to 1979, unionists and nationalists unite against the middle. Unionists and nationalists agree that devolution is unstable, and a slippery slope to independence. They are probably right, as they were probably right twenty years ago when the last Labour government was brought down by Scottish devolution. The only difference between them is that unionists use the argument to frighten people off voting for devolution. (That is Michael Forsyth's strategy, into which Stephen Dorrell blundered). Nationalists, if they are smart, should welcome devolution with open arms.
I am an expatriate Scot and have always up to now been an ardent unionist. In 1976--8, I was chairman of the Economic Development Committee of Tyne and Wear County Council. We, a Labour-controlled council, were outraged that the Labour government was rewarding the Scots for voting SNP, and punishing the Geordies for voting Labour. Scotland's disproportionate share of public spending was as high then as it is now. We encouraged the Northern Group of Labour MPs to oppose a government guillotine on the Scotland Bill, setting in train the events that led to the downfall of both devolution and the Labour government. Neal Ascherson, in The Scotsman, called us `The No-men of England'.
Now, despite Tam Dalyell, Michael Forsyth, and John Major, unionism is not an option. After 18 years of Conservative rule in Scotland without a majority there, and 7 years of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, Scotland must be offered devolution, or federalism, or independence. As devolution as currently proposed is bad for both Scotland and England, why not face up to independence for Scotland? Most of the arguments both for and against Scottish independence are very old and very bad. It is time to discard them.
Why is devolution unfair? Consider the following problems (there are more, but these will do to be going on with):
1. The role of the Secretary of State for Scotland post-devolution 2. Scottish over-representation in the House of Commons 3. Scotland's disproportionate share of public spending 4. Last but not least our old friend the West Lothian Question
Jointly and severally, these will make the devolution settlement bitterly unpopular in England. To address any of them effectively will make it bitterly unpopular in Scotland, too. Progressive opinion in the New Labour think-tanks, the Scottish constitutional circuit, and even among such fellow-expats as Andrew Marr, dismisses them as Unionist bogeymen. New Labour people believe that a Labour Government united behind devolution, as it was not in the 1970s, can wave them aside with no risk of an English backlash. So let us have a look at them, one by one.
1. The role of the Secretary of State for Scotland post-devolution
There isn't one. The departments now controlled by the Secretary of State will be controlled by the executive elected by the Scottish parliament. So there is no case for retaining a Secretary of State for Scotland in the Cabinet beyond a very short transition period.
2. Scottish over-representation in the House of Commons
Scotland has 72 seats in the Commons. On an equal-population basis, it would have 58. At most, it could claim 62 on the basis of protection for its very sparsely populated areas. From time to time, people still try out such lines as `Scotland was guaranteed over-representation in 1707' (it wasn't); Scottish overrepresentation protects Scottish interests' (having your cake, eating it, and then coming back for more); or `Scotland's population loss is England's fault' (an argument which, if conceded, would also bring massive overrepresentation to Tyneside and Merseyside - in fact, to about half of the UK).
These two problems are at least tractable. There is nothing administratively difficult in abolishing the post of Secretary of State or giving Scotland proportionate representation in Parliament. Unfortunately, they would inflame Scottish opinion. But now we come to the real toughies:
3. Scotland's disproportionate share of public spending
A hundred years ago, it was called the Goschen formula; now it is the Barnett formula. Goschen and Barnett were both Treasury ministers who thought they could solve the problem by earmarking a share of public expenditure to Scotland. They merely exacerbated it. The Barnett formula was supposed to ensure that Scottish and English public expenditure per head would converge. The Barnett formula gives Scotland not its population share of public expenditure but its population share of change in public expenditure. The idea was to bring relatively painless convergence of Scotland and England. But Scotland is as far ahead of England as when the Barnett formula was invented in the 1970s. Then, Scotland's GDP per head was 88% of England's; now it is the same. Professor David Heald, who has been studying this problem for more than 20 years, estimates that public expenditure per head on the services that would be devolved to the Scottish executive runs at between 20 and 30% above the UK average. He is supported from a surprising quarter. Michael Forsyth boasted in the most recent (March 1996) Treasury Blue Book of expenditure plans for Scotland that
Next year the public expenditure budget of The Scottish Office will [be] _ more than stlg130 a week on average for every household in Scotland, some stlg30 a week more than the equivalent for England (Cm 3214, Serving Scotland's Needs, Foreword)
The Forsyth game plan is to warn the Scottish electorate that, once these numbers become generally known, they will be unsustainable. Devolution will bring them into the open. Therefore, it will bring Scotland's favourable treatment to an end. Note that the Forsyth game plan depends on the English not reading what he writes for Scottish eyes, such as Serving Scotland's Needs.
Devolutionists wave these figures away. They speak airily of subsidies to the South in transport costs, the National Lottery, or defence procurement spending. They do not produce credible figures. The most recent attempts at a broader balance sheet still put public spending per head in Scotland at between 14% and 24% above the UK average (see David Heald's chapter in the recent IPPR report, The State and the Nations, and the excellent report from the Constitution Unit, Scotland's Parliament: fundamentals for a new Scotland Act, Tables 4 and 5). Can socialists, or even New Labourites, in London, Leeds, or Newcastle, live at ease with these numbers?
4. The West Lothian Question
For the benefit of anybody who has been asleep for 20 years, the West Lothian Question (WLQ) addresses the post-devolution powers of Scots MPs at Westminster. They will be able to speak and vote on domestic matters in England, where they won't be devolved, but not in Scotland, where they will. The standard response is They don't worry about it in Spain/Italy/Northern Ireland between 1920-72. Really, this will not do. The alleged parallels diverge. From 1920 to 1972 Northern Ireland had 12 territorial seats in the House of Commons, when its population share would have entitled it to 18. The deliberate reduction was made because there was a devolved Parliament of Northern Ireland at Stormont. Stormont was abolished in 1972; Northern Ireland underrepresentation in the Commons was ended in 1979. However, the 12 MPs from Ulster were much less likely to hold the balance of power than would 72, or even 58, MPs from Scotland. The Italian `special regions' are a mixed bag of peripheries, from Sicily to Valle d'Aosta, which could never be expected to act in concert; and the variation in powers between ordinary and special regions is now minimal. And, in Spain, the regions with devolved power are such a mixture of rich and poor that the acute Scots-English distributional issues do not arise. Devolutionists retort that it is a much greater scandal that 72 Scottish MPs (or at least 60-odd non-Tory Scottish MPs) have been overruled by 550-odd non-Scottish MPs (or at least 350-odd Tory non-Scottish MPs) since 1979. This is perfectly true, but it does not answer the WLQ. Two wrongs do not make a right.
Everybody who has tried to answer the WLQ, beginning with Gladstone in 1886 and 1893, has reached an impasse. `Home Rule All Round', that is, devolution for England (or English regions) as well as for the three other nations of the UK, has again been rejected by the Labour Party, for the good reason that nobody in England wants it. The `in and out solution' (Scottish MPs not allowed to vote at Westminster on English domestic matters) was first floated, for Ireland, in 1893. It sank then and would not float now, for obvious reasons. Devolutionists who concede that the WLQ is real therefore tend to advocate reduced Scottish representation at Westminster. This is not a solution to the Question, but merely a proposal to take the sting out of it. It must not be conflated (though it often is) with point 2. To deal with the WLQ as well as with overrepresentation would require Scottish representation to be reduced twice. The Stormont parallel implies 40 Scottish seats at Westminster. However the Act of Union, Article XXII, states that `by virtue of this Treaty _ Forty five [shall be] the number of the Representatives of Scotland in the House of Commons of the Parliament of Great Britain'. Some say the Act of Union is an entrenched constitutional document. This has never been used to argue that 45 is a ceiling. But it could be used to argue that 45 is a floor. A floor of 45 Scottish MPs at Westminster may have some moral force.
The Opposition will make all these objections to the Labour devolution plan in the next parliament, as John Major and Michael Forsyth are already doing, and can air them for the whole referendum and legislation period. Of course they will make them for party advantage. But that does not make them invalid. They will awaken the English to the privileged position of Scotland. True, Labour may be able to contain the `English backlash', unlike in 1977-8. But there will be a large majority of MPs whose constituents lose more than they gain from the Scottish devolution proposals.
What prevents Labour from offering Scotland devolution on terms that are fair to everybody - say, a Scottish parliament with no Secretary of State, with 45 Scottish MPs at Westminster, and with a block grant to the Scottish parliament comprising the UK mean expenditure per head on the services that the Scottish parliament will run? The low reason is that that would deprive Labour of too many votes at Westminster. The loftier reason is that it might cause so much anger in Scotland that the Scots were pushed towards independence.
Arguments of naked political advantage cannot be countered by arguments of principle, but `slippery slope' arguments can. Let us take a deep breath and ask: What is wrong with Scottish independence if the Scots vote for it? My answer is, Nothing; the purported objections are both outdated and imperialist. Therefore, it is no argument against a devolution scheme that is fair to the English to say that the Scots will hate it so much that it will drive them into the arms of the SNP.
Consider the main objections to Scottish independence:
1. The Scots couldn't afford it
2. The English couldn't afford to lose Scotland's oil
3. The UK claim to seats at various high tables will be imperilled.
4. Scotland would become a haven of nationalist bigotry
The Scots couldn't afford it
A fair scheme of devolution would confront the Scots with the true relative public spending per head in Scotland and England. With independence, it would have to be funded from within Scotland, with some help from EU regional and structural funds. Monetary union completely changes the monetary arguments. An independent Scotland would be a small open economy in the EU, which (like Ireland) would presumably be keen to join the single currency if it comes into existence. If it changed neither the taxes nor the payments that it inherited, it would have a severe budget deficit that would put it well outside the Maastricht club, but an independent Scotland would have to grow up and address the budget deficit in any case. It would be an attractive location for inward investors who wanted an alternative English-speaking foothold in the EU. Even centre-left writers like those in the recent IPPR report object to independence on the grounds of `the overnight contraction of Scotland's domestic market by 90 per cent, the costs imposed by different currencies, transactions across a national frontier and exchange rate uncertainty _, the disruption to transport infrastructures, suppliers and customers, and an inherited structural budget deficit following the end of equalisation'. But all of these except the last are rendered completely out of date by the development of the EU, and the last has also to be faced in a fair devolution scheme. In any case, it is entirely up to the Scots to decide if they `can afford it'.
The English couldn't afford to lose Scotland's oil
It is questionable how much of it is Scotland's oil. If Scotland became independent, the international boundary would run North-Eastwards out into the North Sea, not (despite nationalist dreams), due East. Therefore, a high proportion of UK North Sea oil production falls in the English sector. True, an independent Scotland would inherit most claims to the North Atlantic shelf, except that Ireland disputes the UK claim to the waters surrounding Rockall. But, if that is what the Scots vote for, the English have no moral right to impede them. Neither the UK nor the Netherlands has managed to show that oil wealth is a prerequisite to growth. More generally, in the developed world, there is no evidence that countries with substantial natural resource endowments grow faster than those without. There is some evidence the other way.
The UK claim to seats at various high tables will be imperilled
The UK's permanent seat on the UN Security Council is a post-1945 anachronism which is long overdue for adjustment irrespective of the position of Scotland. Any special relationship with the USA is a fantasy, with or without Brigadoon. And voting weights of EU member states will have to be adjusted soon, again irrespective of whether Scotland is independent or not. Indeed, some of the sharpest opposition to an independent Scotland might come from the EU, as it would force the issue of voting weights into the open. Scotland would have to be given a Commissioner, and votes in the Council and the Parliament in proportion to the square root of her population. (This is the existing practice: it has good mathematical backing, but the EU seems to have reached it by accident). To argue that any of this imperils vital interests of the UK is both wrong and fundamentally imperialist. In the 19th century, Unionists hung grimly on to Ireland because they thought an independent Ireland would be a landing ground for enemy troops. Psychologically, unionists may still think that about Scotland.
Scotland would become a haven of nationalist bigotry
For sure, there are nationalist bigots in Scotland. There are a lot of nationalist bigots in England, too, and in England, unlike Scotland, they control some of the tabloid newspapers. There is much less chance of the nationalist bigots controlling policy in Scotland than in England. The SNP expelled them years ago, to preserve its electoral appeal. It is true that inward-looking autarkic conservative governments have ruled Ireland for mush of its post-independence history. Eamonn de Valera wanted a self-sufficient theocracy with a constitutional ban on divorce. But that was another world. Nobody likely to win power in Scotland sees it as other than a small open economy in the EU. The globalisation of the economy makes autarky in western Europe impossible. Under EU rules for the mobility of labour, Rangers and Celtic could play in the Premier League, and Berwick Rangers could continue to play in the Scottish League.
*****
Released from the burden of unthinkability, politicians in England and Scotland could negotiate openly, as did Vaclav Klaus of the Czech Republic and Vladimir Meciar of Slovakia when they negotiated the `velvet divorce' in 1992. The English could offer a fair devolution scheme which would end the favourable treatment of Scotland. The Scots could take it or leave it. If they left it, they could become an independent member-state of the European Union. That would be better for both sides than a scheme of devolution which is unfair to the English without placating the Scots. The Scots might feel, as some Slovaks do, that they were bounced. But, unlike the Slovaks, they would have plenty of time to reflect coolly whether they really wanted independence. The choice would be theirs.
Iain McLean is professor of politics, Oxford University and an affiliate of NEXUS. Since 1970, he has conducted extensive research on issues of devolution and distribution in the UK.