Electoral campaigns depend upon the assumption that things will be different if you vote for one party and not the other. All parties of course have an interest in perpetuating this view. Many (perhaps most) voters do not seem to believe them. Once in power, the cynical view goes, parties find themselves constrained by the need to serve the same special interests, the need to cope with familiar problems and occasional crises, and the need to get re-elected.

But elections may be irrelevant in another and ultimately more worrying sense. No matter who is elected on May 1st, the long-term interests of the British people will remain in jeopardy. This is not because of deep ignorance of the problems that we face on the part of our political elites. The reason is institutional rather than party political, and that much more intractable for it. Put simply, the institutional arrangements for generating policy that serves the long-term interests of the British public are woefully inadequate.

Long-term policies are broad in scope, and take many years to come to fruition. Such policies require not only a commitment across the lifetimes of several governments (e.g. raising average qualification levels), but also a truly cross-departmental approach within government itself (e.g. reforming the structure of tax and benefit incentives). At present, competition between government departments for fixed resources controlled by the Treasury means that strategic policy concerns are sacrificed in efforts to preserve and expand shares of the pie. The consequences for public policy of inter-departmental competition are pernicious. Departments have an interest, grounded in both prestige and financial need, in maintaining existing programs irrespective of their costs and benefits. They also frequently enjoy cosy relationships with large 'insider' pressure groups, who by definition have little interest in strategic policy.

Policies that require co-operation, even concessions, between departments do not stand a chance. Take the familiar problem of the poverty trap, for example. Solving the incentive problems that deter people from leaving benefit and entering work involves coordinating housing policy, tax policy, conditions and levels of benefit, and opportunities for education and training. But the very fact that the factors contributing to the poverty trap cross departmental boundaries leads to a situation in which no department has an incentive to take up the cause of its eradication. Poverty is, in this sense, "nobody's baby".

The cause of long-term policy is also harmed by the British electoral system. 'First-past-the-post' has historically generated an oscillation of power between single-party governments, which (particularly since the 1960s) has undermined the search for continuity and consensus between Parliaments. Parties face incentives to push policies that bring short-term rewards appealing to the interests of floating voters in marginal constituencies. Within the parties, strong centralised control by party leaders promotes an ethos of "line-towing" on both sides of the House. Public debate is equated with fragmentation of party discipline and thus deemed an electoral liability. Once in power, politicians also face the temptation to delay the costs of policies. Take the problem of funding public pensions, for example - from Lloyd George to Peter Lilley, government ministers have announced reforms premised upon fudging the central issue of where the money will come from, in the hope that future generations would pick up the tab.

The situation outside government is little better. The activities of most think-tanks is heavily distorted not only by their political viewpoints, but also by the interests of their funders. Meanwhile, the activities of Select Committees (strengthened in 1979 partly in an attempt to increase the influence of Parliament over government policy) are constrained by the civil service's insistence on shielding information from scrutiny, by a lack of institutional back-up, and by the absence of standard Parliamentary procedures for acting on their reports.

How might such institutions be usefully modified? Previous attempts at institutional reform have foundered on the rocks of jealous political parties, Whitehall rivalries, and politicians' unwillingness to accept policy advice. One possibility is that a specialist research unit could be created and attached to Parliament to review strategic policy options, and to provide information on specific enquiries. The unit should have direct links with the Central Statistical Office and the House of Commons Library, and be funded by Parliament rather than by government to distinguish and protect it from Whitehall.

Creating a research unit attached to Parliament must be coupled with a commitment to strengthening the capabilities of parliament for analysing strategic policy. First, Parliament should revive the Special Bill Procedure that was tried out in 1984, according to which Standing Committees review the concepts and content of proposed legislation at an early stage in the legislative cycle (for example through calling expert witnesses). This would not only strengthen Parliament's influence over public policy, but would also encourage MPs to develop the sorts of deliberative skills that are required for strategic policy making. Second, Select Committees should hold joint sittings on issues that cross-cut departmental boundaries, and be charged with the responsibility of enquiring about the long-term objectives of government departments. Third, political parties must be encouraged to think strategically, perhaps through state funding specifically linked to policy research activity and monitored by the Audit Office. Equipped with better resources and better access to information, parties should be expected to produce manifestos that contain concrete (and costed) proposals for government.

At the heart of government, the strategic capacities of Cabinet are hamstrung by departmental divisions and a lack of resources. The Cabinet could be re-organised to include new portfolios which centre on strategic objectives that straddle departmental responsibilities. Junior ministers could then be given specific responsibility for initiatives over the course of a government's lifetime in order to improve a proposal's chance of success.

Of course, there is only so much that refashioning institutions can do, especially if succeeding governments dedicate themselves to refashioning them again. Improving long-term and strategic policy-making relies upon a behavioural change amongst parties and voters alike. What is required of all governments is the courage to establish mechanisms for delivering informed long-term policy options, and the courage not to scrap them when they serve up policies that parties do not like (as happened with the Central Policy Review Staff under Mrs. Thatcher). What is required of voters is the courage to reward parties that contemplate serious options to long-term challenges.

Stewart Wood
(who is a Politics Fellow at Magdalen College, Oxford, and a coordinator of NEXUS).