I think Stuart's framing of civic liberalism is one I basically agree with, although it seems fundamentally the same as William Galston's in Liberal Purposes. I think "tolerance" might not be exactly the right way to put the virtue that Stuart is pointing to. Perhaps "thick skinedness" is better. A liberal society requires one to foreswear using the state to enforce deeply held, often religiously-driven principles. It also requires a willingness to at least get along with people whose beliefs you find highly offensive. The capacity to do this is learned behavior, and any learned behavior has to be acquired somewhere, through some set of institutions.
At the same time, a liberal society requires, it seems to me, a certain willingness not to flangrantly offend, to be willing to exercise the full extent of one's rights away from those whose moral principles would be severely offended. It also requires that one not seek "recognition" or approval of dissenting behavior, which is quite a different thing from tolerance. This willingness to avoid offense is also, it seems to me, a liberal virtue, and one violated by those who see being on the left and baiting the bourgeoisie as the same thing.
If civic liberalism makes any sense, it seems to me, it is a theory of liberal character rather than liberalism as a set of procedures. A liberal society looks like "something." The essential issue, for this group and for liberals at large, is to ask how deep that liberal character is, how comprehensive need the account of the liberal person be? And furthermore, what political and social institutions can encourage this type of character? In particular, is some type of political participation a necessary institution, and does that require a less centralized political system?
steve teles
boston university
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